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Abstract
This paper presents results from a calibrated welfare model of the UK mobile telephony
market which includes many mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; network-
based price discrimination; and call externalities. The analysis focuses on the short-run
effects of adopting lower mobile termination rates (MTRs) on total welfare, consumer surplus
and profits. Our simulations show that reducing MTRs broadly in line with the recent
European Commission Recommendation to either “long-run incremental cost”; reciprocal
termination charges with fixed networks; or “bill-and-keep” (i.e. zero termination rates),
increases social welfare, consumer surplus and networks’ profits. Depending on the strength
of call externalities, social welfare may increase by as much as £360 million to £2.5 billion
per year. The analysis thus lends support to a move away from fully-allocated cost pricing
and towards much lower MTRs, with bill-and-keep frequently leading to the highest increase
in welfare when call externalities matter. We also apply the model to estimate the welfare
effects of the recently-approved merger between Orange and T-Mobile under two different
scenarios concerning MTRs.
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1 Introduction
Mobile termination rates (MTRs) are the charges that mobile firms levy on fixed networks and
other mobile operators for completing, or “terminating”, calls on their networks. According to
a widely-accepted theory, while competition between mobile networks to attract new customers
may be fierce, in the absence of regulation they will still charge excessive prices to other networks
for terminating calls to their subscribers. Concerns about mobile call termination being a
bottleneck service, and a history of high termination charges, have led to the regulation of
MTRs in every country in the European Union, and in numerous other countries around the
world.1
Until now, the approach to regulating MTRs adopted by most European regulatory authori-
ties, including Ofcom in the UK, has been to allow for total cost recovery based on fully-allocated
cost models.2 This approach has been increasingly called into question, however, by a new body
of economic literature which highlights the two-sided nature of mobile interconnection markets,
and the significant role that call externalities play in the analysis of competition, equilibrium
pricing, and entry in these markets.3 Impetus for change has also come from the entry of new
mobile network operators in many European countries, who argue that their growth and prof-
itability have been hampered by high MTRs and the significant levels of on-net/off-net price
discrimination adopted by incumbent mobile network operators (MNOs).4
In May 2009, the European Commission (EC, 2009a) issued a Recommendation on the Reg-
ulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU which sets out its views
on how national regulators in Europe, such as Ofcom, should approach this issue in future. The
Commission’s Recommendation and accompanying documents (EC, 2009b; 2009c) reflect much
of this new economic thinking and experience, and propose dramatic reductions in MTRs to
reflect the actual incremental costs of providing voice call termination services to third parties.5
Following the EC’s Recommendation, Ofcom published a consultation document (Ofcom, 2009a)
which reconsiders the pros and cons of a number of alternative approaches to regulating MTRs.
These include: (i) long-run incremental cost pricing (LRIC), broadly the approach recommended
1See Armstrong (2002, Section 3.1), Wright (2002) and Armstrong and Wright (2009a) for the standard theory.
The characterization of mobile call termination as a monopoly or “bottleneck” service assumes that mobile
operators can make take-it-or-leave-it offers to fixed-line operators and to each other, which is typically justified
by reference to various interconnectivity obligations. Binmore and Harbord (2005) question this assumption,
and provide an analysis of mobile call termination instead as a bilateral-monopoly bargaining problem. See also
Armstrong and Wright (2007, Section 3.5).
2Ofcom regulates the termination charges of the five UK mobile operators at “long-run incremental cost plus”
(“LRIC +”). It treats fixed-to-mobile (FTM) and mobile-to-mobile (MTM) termination charges symmetrically,
and uses a detailed cost model to estimate “LRIC +” by allocating the fixed and common costs of a hypothetical
efficient network operator over mobile retail and wholesale services. See Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010).
3See, for example, DeGraba (2003); Jeon et al. (2004); Berger (2004) (2005); Hoernig (2007); Calzada and
Valletti (2008); Hermalin and Katz (2009); Armstrong and Wright (2009b); Cabral (2009); and Hoernig (2009a).
Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010) provide a survey of much of this literature.
4See the European “mobile challengers” web page for some industry views on these issues
(www.mobilechallengers.eu).
5This reduction is to be implemented by no longer allowing costs which are common between services to be
recovered from regulated termination charges. According to the Commission, this could result in a decrease in
average MTRs in Europe from approximately 8.55 euro cents per minute at present, to 2.5 euro cents per minute
or less by 2012. While the Commission’s recommendation also deals with termination rates on fixed networks,
mobile termination rates are typically ten times higher than fixed termination rates in Europe (the latter ranging
from 0.57 to 1.13 euro cents per minute), and so have been of much less concern.
by the EC;6 (ii) imposing reciprocity with fixed networks, i.e. setting mobile termination charges
to match the regulated rates of fixed-line network operators; and (iii) adopting “bill-and-keep”,
which would effectively abolish mobile termination charges by setting them equal to zero.7
While the first option is in line with the EC’s Recommendation, reciprocity with fixed net-
works would also significantly reduce MTRs, since fixed-line operators’ regulated termination
rates are typically an order of magnitude below those charged by mobile networks. Bill-and-keep
represents the most dramatic change in policy, but it has already been adopted in a number of
countries (such as the USA, Canada, Hong Kong and Singapore: see Harbord and Pagnozzi,
2010; Analysys Mason, 2008), and was recently recommended by the European Regulators’
Group (ERG, 2009).
Ofcom (2009a) discusses the pros and cons of these various approaches in a purely qualitative
and largely informal way.8 The EC’s Recommendation is also largely based upon purely qual-
itative argument, although as noted, these arguments have been the subject of a great deal of
formal economic modelling in recent years, and the Recommendation is broadly consistent with
the conclusions which seem to emerge from this new literature.9 What is lacking, therefore, is a
realistic quantitative assessment of the welfare consequences of adopting one or another of the
alternatives now being aired. The main purpose in this paper is to provide such an assessment
for the UK mobile market.
Building on the standard model employed by nearly all economists to analyze competition,
pricing and welfare in network markets such as mobile telephony, we estimate the impact on
total welfare, consumer surplus and producer surplus of a decrease in MTRs in the UK mar-
ket from their current regulated levels to one or another of the alternatives described above.
Our quantitative analysis is based on Hoernig (2009b), which provides an analytically tractable
model of competition between multiple, asymmetrically-sized mobile networks and allows us to
determine both consumer surplus and networks’ profits in the imperfectly competitive equilib-
rium.10 The main obstacle to applying models of telecommunications competition to real-world
markets to date has been the need to assume either a duopoly market, or symmetric firms, since
models with several asymmetric networks were considered intractable. Few real-world mobile
markets in Europe or elsewhere satisfy either of these assumptions, however. Hoernig (2009b)
6Ofcom use the term ”long-run marginal cost” (LRMC) to refer to the EC’s “LRIC” proposal. Since the EC’s
terminology corresponds more closely to common usage, we adopt it in this paper.
7Each of these alternatives is considered in the EC recommendation. See in particular EC (2009b, p. 29)
where it is noted that, “a significant reduction of termination rates from current levels might create appropriate
incentives for voluntary inter-operator agreements and consequently Bill and Keep type arrangements could evolve
naturally”.
8Ofcom (2007, Annex 19) reports the results of a formal welfare analysis which was intended to provide
‘an order of magnitude indication of the consumer welfare gain from regulating MCT charges ’. As Ofcom itself
recognized, however (in paragraph A17:15), this analysis is unable to account for such crucial factors as call
externalities, imperfect competition and price discrimination, and as such is unsuited to the task of estimating
the welfare gains from reducing MTRs.
9Section 4 and Annex of EC (2009c) provide the Commission staff’s own estimate of the welfare effects of
following the Recommendation. This calculation is performed at an aggregate level for the whole of the European
Union for the period 2007 — 2012, and the resulting welfare gain is found to be at most 1 billion Euros, if not
slightly negative. As with Ofcom’s 2007 model, this computation is incapable of capturing the effects of call
externalities, imperfect competition and asymmetries between mobile operators.
10Market Analysis (2008) was an earlier version of this model, but could not separately solve for consumer
surplus and network profits, and hence only reported total welfare comparisons. Hoernig (2008) contains many of
the ingredients of the current analysis but considers only duopoly networks, with no allowance for fixed-to-mobile
and mobile-to-fixed (MTF) calls.
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resolves this problem by solving a general model of competition between an arbitrary number
of interconnected telecommunications networks with asymmetries in both network and per cus-
tomer fixed costs. As in Hoernig’s (2007) duopoly analysis, the model includes tariff-mediated
network externalities, i.e. price discrimination between on-net and off-net calls, call externalities
(i.e. receiver benefits), and networks can be asymmetric in size.
We calibrate this model using data pertaining to the UK mobile market, and solve for the
(Hotelling) equilibrium tariffs under alternative assumptions concerning the level of MTRs and
the importance of the receiver benefits, or call externalities. Our simulation results in Section 4
show that although consumer surplus and economic welfare may decrease in the mobile market
considered in isolation as we reduce the level of MTRs, aggregate welfare and consumer surplus
increase in the telecommunications market as a whole for all reasonable values of the ratio of
receiver to sender benefits (the call externality parameter in our model). Depending on the
strength of call externalities, our model predicts market-wide welfare improvements of £360
million to £2.5 billion per annum, with bill-and-keep often resulting in the greatest increase
in overall welfare. Inclusion of the fixed-line operator in the analysis is thus indispensable to
assessing the economic effects of reductions in MTRs.
A number of recent papers have argued that reducing MTRs will necessarily reduce con-
sumer surplus, and possibly welfare, in the mobile market (Gans and King, 2001, Hoernig, 2008,
Armstrong and Wright, 2009a).11 As we discuss in more detail in Section 5, however, these
arguments are incomplete and do not necessarily survive the inclusion of fixed networks, call ex-
ternalities, and a more realistic number of competing networks in the analysis. It then becomes
an empirical question whether a reduction in MTRs will result in an increase or a decrease in
welfare and consumer surplus on mobile networks considered in isolation. In our simulations,
consumer surplus and welfare increase in both the mobile and fixed markets when call external-
ities are significant. Hence, the trade-off between increasing welfare and maintaining consumer
surplus in the mobile market disappears once these factors are taken into account.
Our simulation model provides a rigorous and quantifiable approach to assessing the likely
consequences of changes in policy towards regulating MTRs, in the UK and elsewhere. Another
natural application is to analyze the recently-approved merger between Orange and T-Mobile,
which will create a single firm with almost 40% of all UK mobile subscribers. Doing so allows
us to predict the merger’s effects on economic efficiency, consumer welfare and mobile firms’
profits.
We show in Section 6 that with MTRs set at their regulated levels for 2010/11, the overall
effect of the merger depends on the strength of call externalities. In the absence of call external-
ities, the merger improves allocative efficiency by moving more subscribers on to a single large
network, thus avoiding the inefficiencies associated with high off-net call prices, themselves a
product of MTRs which exceed marginal cost. In other words, the merger may help to ameliorate
the negative effects of above-cost MTRs as currently allowed by the UK regulatory authorities.
With any significant level of call externalities, this result is reversed by the strategic incentive
of the newly merged firm to increase its off-net call prices.12 Hence there is a critical level of
11The Royal Economic Society’s media briefing “European Decision on Mobile Charges May Not Benefit Cus-
tomers,” emphasizes this aspect of the Armstrong and Wright (2009a) analysis, suggesting that, “reducing termi-
nation charges to very low levels – such as those in the EU’s guidance – may come at a cost to mobile subscribers
since ultimately mobile operators may end up competing less aggressively for their customers”.
12 It is a standard result of the literature that, in the presence of call externalities, a network’s off-net prices are
increasing in its own market share. See Jeon et al. (2004); Hoernig (2007)(2009b); and Harbord and Pagnozzi
(2010).
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the call externality parameter for which the merger becomes harmful to allocative efficiency and
welfare. When call externalities are large, our simulations predict overall welfare losses from
the merger exceeding £1.4 billion per year, dwarfing the cost savings of £390 - £420 million per
year predicted by the companies themselves. If we perform our simulations with much lower
MTRs, such as those proposed in recent European Commission Recommendation, the (negative
or positive) effects of the merger on aggregate welfare are much reduced, however.
Since the merger reduces the number of competitors in the mobile market, it reduces the
intensity of competition between mobile networks to attract new subscribers. This induces
mobile firms to raise the level of their fixed charges, increasing profits at the expense of consumer
surplus. The resulting losses in consumer surplus under current MTRs exceed £1.8 billion per
annum in the absence of call externalities in our simulations, and up to £2.9 billion per year
when the receiver/sender benefit ratio equals one. Even if MTRs were significantly reduced prior
to the merger (to bill-and-keep in our simulations), the consumer surplus losses still exceed £1.2
billion per annum for any level of MTRs, as we report in Section 6.2. Although the European
Commission has recently approved the merger, subject to certain undertakings agreed by the
companies (see EC, 2010), it is difficult to see how these conditions will allay the competition-
related concerns illustrated by our simulation model.13
Section 2 of the paper describes our underlying Hotelling model, based on Hoernig (2009b).
Section 3 details our calibration to UK market data and Section 4 the welfare simulation results.
Section 5 discusses our short-run assumptions and considers some longer-run implications of
reducing MTRs. Section 6 reports our results on the Orange/T-Mobile merger, and Section 7
concludes.
2 The Model
The model we use is a generalization of the network competition models of Laffont et al. (1998)
and Carter and Wright (1999)(2003) to include many asymmetric networks. For more details
see Hoernig (2009b).14
Networks: We assume n mobile networks of different size and one fixed network.15 Networks
face a given fixed cost per subscriber and constant marginal costs for originating and terminating
calls. All networks are interconnected and terminate incoming calls at prices given by their
respective termination rates. Consumers perceive mobile networks as providing substitutable,
differentiated services, hence we consider imperfectly competitive market equilibria in the mobile
market. Consumers perceive fixed and mobile networks as providing non-substitutable services,
however, so there is no strategic competition between fixed and mobile networks.
13These conditions are a revised network-sharing agreement with H3G UK, and an offer to divest 15 MHz of
spectrum at the 1800 MHz level.
14Several papers have analysed network competition with more than two networks. Symmetric networks are
assumed by Calzada and Valletti (2008) and Armstrong and Wright (2009b). Dewenter and Haucap (2005)
consider more than two asymmetric networks, but can only solve for the resulting per-minute call prices. Closest
to Hoernig (2009b) is Thompson, Renard and Wright (2007), which uses a similar demand specification and
considers an arbitrary number of networks. However, networks in their model do not price discriminate between
on-net and off-net calls, and no closed-form solution for the equilibrium can be derived.
15There are a number of fixed-line networks in the UK, including BT, Virgin Media and Cable and Wireless.
BT’s share of subscribers in 2008 exceeded 60% (Ofcom 2009b, Table 2). We assume a single fixed-line network
here, which sets FTM prices as described immediately below.
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Each mobile network’s subscriber market share is denoted by αi > 0, i = 1, ..., n, with∑n
i=1 αi = 1. Mobile network i incurs a yearly fixed cost per customer of fi, and has on-net
call costs of cii = coi + cti per call minute, where the indices o and t stand for origination and
termination, respectively. The mobile termination rate (MTR) on network i is denoted ai, so
the cost of an off-net call from network i to network j = i is cij = coi + aj . The fixed network’s
termination rate (FTR) is af = ctf , the cost of call termination on the fixed network. Hence
the cost of a call from mobile network i to the fixed network is cif = cio + af . We only consider
calls between the fixed and mobile networks, and neglect other services on the fixed network,
including on-net calls.
Tariffs: Mobile networks offer their retail customers a ‘bundle’ of mobile access, on-net calls,
and off-net calls to other mobile networks and to the fixed network. Each mobile network i
charges its subscribers an annual subscription fee Fi,16 and per-minute call prices of pii for on-
net calls and pij for off-net calls to network j = i. We assume that mobile networks charge
uniform off-net prices to other mobile networks, i.e. pij = pik for j, k = i. The price of calls to
the fixed network is denoted pif . We do not consider other services offered by mobile networks,
such as international calls, SMS and data services, as their interaction with mobile voice calls is
not clear and is likely to evolve over time.17
The fixed network charges a per-minute price pfm for calls to mobile networks, which we
assume to be equal to the (weighted) average MTR, a¯ =
∑n
i=1 αiai, plus a fixed retention rate
rf to cover its cost of origination: hence pfm = rf + a¯.
18
Consumers: We assume a fixed number of M subscribers in the mobile market, and N sub-
scribers on the fixed network. Each consumer makes calls to all potential recipients on the fixed
and mobile networks with equal probability, so in the absence of price differentials we would
have a balanced calling pattern. That is, each subscriber on a mobile networks calls all potential
receivers with the same probability ρ per one million users, and each fixed network subscriber
calls all potential receivers with probability ρf per one million users.
19 The demand for call
length differs between subscribers on mobile networks and on the fixed network, however.
Networks’ customers receive utility from making calls, as a function of call length and the
number of calls made. They also obtain utility from receiving calls, independently of their
origin, so there is a call externality. Specifically, the utility derived from making, or receiving
a call of length q is u (q), or βu (q), respectively, where β ≥ 0 measures the strength of the
call externality. Given a per-minute price p, consumers demand calls of length q (p), with the
resulting surplus of v (p) = maxq u (q (p))− pq (p). In the following we will simplify notation by
denoting qij = q (pij), uij = u (qij), vij = v (pij) etc., for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., n, f}.
A single consumer’s surplus from a given tariff is then the sum of his/her net utility from
making and receiving calls minus the subscription fee. Consumers make their choice of network
based on their own personal preferences for specific networks and the net surplus resulting from
the tariffs on offer.
16Yearly subscription fees are used without loss of generality in order to simplify notation and because the time
frame under consideration is one year.
17Ofcom (2007, A19:16) assumes that the corresponding cross-elasticities of demand are small.
18The setting of FTM prices in our model follows Ofcom (2007, A19.26).
19Since the demand functions calibrated in Section 3 below are linear, the values for ρ and ρf can be set
arbitrarily as long as ρ/ρf remains constant. We have chosen values for these parameters which result in realistic
call quantities per subscriber.
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A client of network i then obtains the following surplus from making and receiving calls to
and from mobile networks and the fixed network:
wi = ρM
n∑
j=1
αj (vij + βuji) + ρN
(
vif +
ρf
ρ
βufi
)
− Fi
= ρM
n∑
j=1
αjhij + ρNhif − Fi,
where hij = (vij + βuji) and hif =
(
vif +
ρf
ρ
βufi
)
. In matrix notation, this can be written as20
w = dMhα+ dNhf − F,
where we have introduced the matrix h = (hij)ij and the vectors w = (wi)i, α = (αi)i, hf =
(hif )i and F = (Fi)i. Aggregate consumer surplus on mobile networks is then given by
S =Mα′w.
Consumer surplus in the fixed telephony market (FTM and MTF calls) is
Sf = NρfM
n∑
i=1
αi
(
vfi +
ρ
ρf
βuif
)
= Nα′ρfMgf ,
where gfi = vfi +
ρ
ρf
βuif and gf = (gfi)i.
Market shares: We assume that consumers consider mobile networks as offering differentiated
products in the standard Hotelling fashion, with n firms of unequal size in the market. The
resulting expression for market shares is
αi = α0i + σ
∑
j =i
(wi −wj) ,
where α0i captures ex-ante asymmetries in “brand loyalty”, or consumers’ valuations of different
networks, and σ > 0 measures the degree of differentiation between operators’ offers.21 In our
simulations of short-run effects market shares will be kept constant.
Profits and welfare: Network i’s profits are given by
πi =Mαi
ρM n∑
j=1
αjRij + ρNQi + Fi − fi
 ,
where Rii = (pii − cii) qii for on-net calls and Rij = (pij − cij) qij + (ai − cti) qji for off-net calls
to other mobile networks. Furthermore, Qi = (pif − cif ) qif +
ρf
ρ
(ai − cti) qfi are profits from
MTF calls and FTM termination. Joint profits of all mobile networks can be written as
Π =Mα′ (ρMRα+ ρNQ+ F − f) ,
20For these and other mathematical details, consult Hoernig (2009b).
21Existence and stability of equilibrium requires that networks be sufficiently differentiated, or that σ is not
too large. See Hoernig (2009b, Section 2.2).
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where R = (Rij)ij , Q = (Qi)i and f = (fi)i.
The profits of the fixed network from FTM calls are
πf = NρfM
n∑
i=1
αirfqf = NρfMrfqf .
Total welfare is then
W = S + Sf +Π+ πf .
Equilibrium outcomes: We model the imperfectly competitive market outcome that will
result from mobile networks’ offering tariffs such that no single network would like to change
its offer given the other offers. The equilibrium outcome determines call prices, subscription
fees and the resulting consumer surplus and network profits. It can be shown through standard
techniques that equilibrium call prices on mobile networks will take on the following form:
pii =
cii
1 + β
,
pij =
∑
j =i αjcij
1− (1 + β)αi
, j = i,
pif = cif .
Equally, it can be shown that equilibrium fixed fees are given by
F = f − dNQ+ ρM
(
Rˆ−R
)
α,
where Rˆ =
(
Rˆij
)
ij
with Rˆij = 0 if i = j and
Rˆii =
1
σρMHii
−
n∑
j=1
Hji
Hii
Rij .
Here we have used (Hij)ij = (I − σdMBh)
−1B andB = (Bij)ij , where I is the (n× n)−identity
matrix, and Bii = n − 1 and Bij = −1 if i = j. Network i’s equilibrium profit is found to be
πi = α
2
i ρM
2Rˆii, and joint equilibrium profits are Π = ρM
2α′Rˆα.
3 The Calibration
The model described in Section 2 above has been calibrated with data from Ofcom (2009a)
(2009b) (2009c) (2009d).
Utility and demand parameters: Linear demand functions for mobile-originated calls have
been calibrated using data from Ofcom for the year 2008, which was the latest full year available.
We assume 76.8 million mobile subscribers (Ofcom, 2009d, Fig. 4.28) who demand 111,000
million call minutes per year (Ofcom, 2009d, Fig. 4.71) at an average per minute price of
5.9 pence per minute (ppm). According to Ofcom (2009d, Fig. 4.58), the average price of a
mobile call minute in 2008 was 10.4 ppm, but ‘this number is over-stated as it includes the
value of the handset subsidy which mobile operators recoup over the duration of the contract’ via
monthly subscription charges (Ofcom, 2009d, p. 244). Since we clearly do not wish to include all
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subscription revenues in the average per minute call price, some means of adjusting this figure
must be found. On the one hand, we could argue that the figure should include no subscription
revenues at all, effectively assuming that contract subscribers behave as if the “free” call minutes
included in their contracts were literally free. While some contract subscribers undoubtedly do
behave in this way, it seems likely that many implicitly ration their calls to avoid facing “out of
bundle” per minute call prices, or the need to purchase more expensive contracts which include
a larger number of “free” call minutes.
There is no obviously right way to deal with this issue, so we choose some relatively con-
servative assumptions. According to data provided in Ofcom (2009d, Fig. 4.22), the average
price of a new mobile contract in 2008 was between £300 and £360 annually. Since there were
29.9 million contract customers in 2008 (see Ofcom, 2009d, Fig. 4.43), if we take an average
subscription fee of £330 per annum, and assume that one half of this figure is for basic “sub-
scription”, then our estimated “per minute” call revenues become £6,567 million, slightly more
than half of Ofcom’s reported call plus subscription revenues of £11,500 million (Ofcom, 2009d,
Fig. 4.39). Dividing this figure by total call minutes results in an average mobile-originated call
price of 5.9 ppm.
Linear demand functions for fixed-to-mobile calls have been calibrated using data fromOfcom
(2009b) for the year 2008. We assume 33.048 million fixed line subscribers (Table 2) who demand
13,300 million FTM call minutes per year (Table 5), at an average price per minute of 11.7 ppm
(Tables 4 and 5).22
We assume an elasticity of demand for mobile-originated calls of −0.5, and an elasticity of
−0.3 for fixed-to-mobile calls. These are consistent with estimates found in the recent literature,
and with those presented to the UK Competition Commission in 2003.23 Simulation results when
we assume an elasticity of demand of −0.3 for both mobile-originated calls and fixed-to-mobile
calls are presented in Annex A.
The parameter measuring the strength of call externalities (β) is varied between five levels,
from zero (i.e. no call externalities) to the maximal value of 1 (i.e. the receiving party receives
the same utility as the sending party). Arguably, a value of at least 0.5 is realistic, even if
we allow for some “internalization” of call externalities between individuals in “stable calling
relationships” with one another.24
Market shares: Mobile subscriptions by network operator for 2008 have been taken from
Ofcom (2009d, Figure. 4.42). This results in the subscriber market shares specified in Table 3.1
below.
22This figure does not include any subscription revenues.
23Dewenter and Haucap (2007) have recently estimated demand elasticities for mobile-originated calls in Austria.
They find firm-specific, short-run elasticities between -0.26 and -0.40, and long-run elasticities between -0.46 and
-1.1. Various estimates of demand elasticities for mobile originated and fixed-to-mobile calls were presented to
the UK Competition Commission’s ‘calls to mobiles’ inquiry in 2003 (see Competition Commission, 2003, Table
8.7). These ranged from -0.48 to -0.8 for mobile originated calls, and from -0.08 to -0.63 for fixed-to-mobile calls.
Jerry Hausman submitted estimates for the own-price elasticity of mobile-originated calls of between —0.5 to —0.6
for the USA. Ofcom stated that a reasonable range for the own-price elasticities was between —0.2 and —0.4 for
both mobile-originated and fixed-to-mobile calls.
24See Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010) for a discussion.
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Table 3.1 Subscribers and Market Shares, 2008
H3G Vodafone O225 Orange T-Mobile26
Subscribers (m) 4.5 17.7 21.5 16.4 16.8
Market Shares (%) 5.9% 23.0% 28.0% 21.3% 21.8%
The mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs), such as Virgin Mobile and Tesco Mobile,
are not included as independent firms in our analysis.27 Tesco Mobile is a 50/50 joint venture
between Telefónica O2 UK and Tesco plc, and hence acts as a retail arm of O2. Virgin Mobile
was originally formed as a joint venture between T-Mobile and the Virgin Group, however in
January 2004 the Virgin Group bought out T-Mobile and subsequently became part of the
Virgin Media Group in 2006.28
Given the networks’ market shares, we have chosen a value for the network differentiation
parameter (σ) of the underlying Hotelling model in the stable range.29 The choice of this
parameter has no influence at all our overall welfare estimates or comparisons, and relatively
little influence on changes in profits and consumer surplus in our comparisons.
Costs on mobile and fixed networks: Ofcom (2007, A19:18) assume fixed costs per mobile
subscription of £95.38 per year. We allow for no fixed costs in our model since we only wish
to include the avoidable per subscriber costs faced by networks, which are largely composed
of handset subsidies. But the level of each mobile network’s handset subsidy is determined by
the level of their fixed fees in our model, which are themselves a function of the intensity of
competition between the networks, and hence the levels of the MTRs. In order to avoid this
endogeneity problem we assume that avoidable per-customer fixed costs are zero.
We assume a (long-run) marginal or incremental cost of originating and terminating calls on
mobile networks of 1 ppm.30 Marginal costs of origination and termination on the fixed network
are taken from Ofcom (2009c, Table A2.10) which reports termination costs of 0.198 ppm and
origination costs of 0.212 ppm. The average level of BT’s regulated termination charge in 2008
is 0.207 ppm, which includes an allowance for fixed and common costs.31 We assume that the
fixed network sets the fixed-to-mobile price by charging a fixed retention rate of 6.2 ppm over the
average mobile termination rate, derived by subtracting the average mobile termination charge
in 2008 from the average retail price of fixed-to-mobile calls.32
25 Includes Tesco Mobile subscribers (1.7 million in December 2008: see www.o2.com/about/tesco_mobile.asp).
26 Includes Virgin Mobile subscribers (4.76 million, Ofcom, 2009d, Fig. 4.24).
27Overall, MVNOs and other service providers using existing mobile networks accounted for 12.7% of mobile
subscriptions in 2008 (Ofcom, 2009d, Fig. 4,24).
28See http://about.virginmobile.com/aboutus/about/history/.
29This parameter has been set at 0.000333 in the simulations reported below.
30The French regulator, ARCEP (2008), estimates LRIC on mobile networks to lie between 1 and 2 eurocents per
minute (i.e. 0.9 ppm and 1.8 ppm). Hutchison 3G UK Limited (2009, Annex 2) estimates LRIC at approximately
0.5 ppm. Ofcom (2009a, Annex 9, para A1.33) studies mobile retail call charges in the United States and concludes
that “what we observe from these retail tariffs seems to suggest that the perceived per minute cost is zero or close
to zero”. Hence an assumed long-run marginal or incremental cost of 1 ppm seems reasonable. Experimenting
with lower or higher figures makes only minimal differences to our results.
31Ofcom (2009c, Table A2.10). This is consistent with Ofcom (2009a), Paragraph 2.18, which states: “Wholesale
FCT charges are currently no more than 0.25 pence per minute. BT’s actual FCT charges vary by time of day.
The average charges are currently between 0.17ppm and 0.25ppm depending on the point of interconnection and
the extent of conveyance (eg single/double tandem)”.
32Ofcom (2007, A19.26) follow a similar approach.
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In our base scenario, mobile networks’ termination rates are set at Ofcom’s “LRIC+” levels
for 2010/11, the final year of the current price control. These are 4.6 ppm for H3G and 4.3
ppm for the four other mobile operators.33 The base scenario is then compared with three other
scenarios, with MTRs set at: (i) “LRIC” (or “LRMC”); (ii) the average price of termination on
the fixed network; and (iii) zero, or bill-and-keep.
4 Simulation Results
This section reports our simulation results, for call externality parameters (β) of 0, 0.25, 0.5,
0.75 and 1, respectively, and for a LRMC value of 1.0 ppm. All results are reported in £ million
per calendar year in 2008/09 prices. Increases of the variables under consideration, as compared
to the base scenario (LRIC+), are given by positive values and decreases by negative values.34
Aggregate effects: As shown in Table 4.1, total welfare, i.e. the sum of social welfare in
the mobile and the fixed markets, increases significantly under all three alternative scenarios for
MTRs . The extent of the increase depends upon the size of the call externality parameter, and
exceeds £2.2 billion per year in all scenarios when β is equal to one, i.e. with equal caller and
receiver benefits.
Table 4.1 Change in Welfare Over “LRIC+” Pricing
β = 0 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 1
LRMC Pricing 367 648 1023 1537 2272
Reciprocal with Fixed 366 675 1086 1651 2459
Bill-and-Keep 360 674 1091 1665 2485
In the absence of call externalities, the increase in aggregate welfare is caused by aligning
MTRs more closely to marginal costs, since above-cost MTRs distort call prices upwards and call
quantities downwards. Hence, when β = 0, it is unsurprising that LRMC pricing results in the
largest welfare increase.35 When call externalities matter, welfare-maximizing MTRs are always
below cost, however, for two reasons. First, in the absence of strategic effects, below-cost MTRs
induce networks to “internalize” call externalities by setting off-net prices below cost. Second,
since call externalities create strategic incentives for mobile firms to increase their off-net prices,
reducing MTRs below marginal cost mitigates this effect.36 Hence bill-and-keep increasingly
dominates LRMC pricing in welfare terms as we increase β from zero to one.
As discussed in more detail in Section 5 below, reducing MTRs reduces network effects and
relaxes price competition in the mobile market. This can result in lower levels of mobile consumer
surplus for small values of β. Consumer surplus in the fixed market always increases, however,
33These are the final 2010/11 values as determined by the Competition Commission (2009) of 4.3 ppm and 4.0
ppm respectively, indexed by inflation to increase from 2006/07 prices to 2008/09 prices.
34The calculations have been performed in Excel. Further details on the simulation model and its results are
available from the authors on request.
35Because of the distortion in FTM prices caused by the assumed level of fixed retention, this is not necessarily
the case. As our simulations with a mobile demand elasticity of -0.3 show (see Table A.1 in Annex A), reducing
MTRs below cost can be optimal even when β = 0, in order to align the FTM price more closely with marginal
cost.
36See Armstrong and Wright (2009b), Berger (2004) (2005), Hoernig (2008), and Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010).
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due to the reduction in the FTM call price. In the absence of call externalities (i.e. β = 0),
the former effect dominates the latter for bill-and-keep and reciprocal termination rates in our
simulation, hence aggregate consumer surplus decreases. For β ≥ 0.25 this result is reversed,
and for large call externalities (i.e. β = 1), aggregate consumer surplus increases by more than
£1.2 billion in every scenario (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.2 Change in Consumer Surplus Over “LRIC+” Pricing
β = 0 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 1
LRMC Pricing 29 217 464 800 1276
Reciprocal with Fixed -31 174 443 810 1328
Bill-and-Keep -51 157 429 800 1326
Finally, the sum of profits in the fixed and mobile markets increases in all scenarios for any
value of β (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3 Change in Profits Over “LRIC+” Pricing
β = 0 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 1
LRMC Pricing 337 431 558 736 997
Reciprocal with Fixed 397 501 643 841 1131
Bill-and-Keep 411 517 662 864 1159
Summing up, aggregate welfare and profits increase with reductions in MTRs to any of the
three alternatives considered, and aggregate consumer surplus also increases when call external-
ities are significant.
Mobile telephony: We now consider the mobile market in isolation, that is, the effect of
reducing MTRs on consumer surplus, welfare and profits from making and receiving MTM calls,
and from receiving FTM calls only. According to our simulations, welfare decreases in the
mobile market when the call externality parameter β is very low, but increases in all scenarios
for β > 0.25 (see Table 4.4).
Table 4.4 Change in Mobile Welfare Over “LRIC+” Pricing
β = 0 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 1
LRMC Pricing -174 107 481 996 1731
Reciprocal with Fixed -310 -1 410 975 1783
Bill-and-Keep -352 -38 380 953 1773
The reduction in mobile welfare for low values of β is caused by the reduction in consumer
surplus, itself a product of the relaxation in mobile-to-mobile network competition and reduced
fixed-to-mobile transfers. With higher levels of call externalities, this effect is reversed (Table
4.5).
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Table 4.5 Change in Mobile Consumer Surplus Over “LRIC+” Pricing
β = 0 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 1
LRMC Pricing -444 -256 -9 327 802
Reciprocal with Fixed -623 -418 -149 218 736
Bill-and-Keep -674 -467 -194 177 702
Mobile networks’ profits on the other hand, increase for all levels of β (Table 4.6).
Table 4.6 Change in Mobile Profits Over “LRIC+” Pricing
β = 0 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 1
LRMC Pricing 270 363 490 669 929
Reciprocal with Fixed 313 417 559 757 1047
Bill-and-Keep 323 429 574 776 1071
Fixed telephony: Finally, we consider the effects of reducing MTRs on the fixed market. The
model includes profits and consumer surplus from FTM calls, and also consumer surplus from
receiving MTF calls. Fixed termination rates are set at cost, so there are no termination profits.
The estimated values for changes in welfare, consumer surplus and profits in the fixed market
do not depend on the size of the call externality, since the mobile-to-fixed price is independent
of the level of MTRs.
Welfare in the fixed market increases significantly, for two reasons: First, transfers to mobile
networks are reduced, and second, FTM call prices are brought closer to their efficient level.
Almost all of the increase in welfare on the fixed network is due to the increase in consumer
surplus created by lower FTM call prices.
Table 4.7 Change Over “LRIC+” Pricing
Welfare Consumer Surplus Profits
LRMC Pricing 541 473 68
Reciprocal with Fixed 676 592 84
Bill-and-Keep 712 623 88
Profits of the fixed network increase only slightly in our simulations, and this is entirely due
to the assumed level of fixed retention (i.e. the fixed network’s margin on FTM calls) being
applied to a larger number of call minutes. Thus the reduction in transfers to the mobile market
accrues entirely to consumers on the fixed network.
5 Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Reducing MTRs
Our simulations show that although consumer surplus and economic welfare may decrease in
the mobile market considered in isolation when we reduce the level of MTRs, overall welfare,
consumer surplus and firms’ profits increase in the telecommunications market as a whole,
for all reasonable values of the call externality parameter. Depending on the strength of call
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externalities, our model predicts welfare improvements of £360 million to £2.5 billion per annum,
with bill-and-keep often resulting in the greatest increase in overall welfare.37 Inclusion of the
fixed-line operator in the analysis is thus indispensable to assessing the economic effects of
reductions in MTRs.
A number of recent papers have argued that reductions in MTRs will necessarily reduce
consumer surplus, and possibly welfare, in the mobile market, however, and for two reasons.
First, a fixed-to-mobile termination charge above cost results in a flow of termination profits to
mobile networks, some or all of which is passed on to mobile subscribers via the “waterbed”
effect.38 Hence mobile subscribers should prefer fixed-to-mobile termination rates set at the
monopoly (i.e. profit-maximizing) level. As Armstrong and Wright (2009a, p. F286) have put
it, “high FTM termination charges are a means of transferring surplus from fixed callers to
mobile recipients”.
Second, mobile subscribers can also benefit from above-cost mobile-to-mobile termination
rates, since high MTM charges make off-net calls more expensive than on-net calls, creating
network effects which favour larger networks. This intensifies competition between networks to
attract subscribers by reducing their equilibrium subscription charges. The much-cited result is
that equilibrium consumer surplus on mobile networks is increasing in the level of the mobile-
to-mobile termination rate (Gans and King, 2001; Armstrong and Wright, 2009a).39
While these arguments have been much aired in recent regulatory debates, they are subject to
a number of important caveats. The argument with respect to fixed-to-mobile termination rates
is incomplete in two important respects. First, as observed by Armstrong and Wright (2009a, p.
F284), even if all fixed-line subscribers have a mobile phone, high termination rates still create an
allocative inefficiency, and hence the gain to mobile subscribers from low subscription charges is
always outweighed by the welfare loss on the fixed network from high fixed-to-mobile termination
rates. Since most telephone subscribers use both fixed and mobile networks, the increase in
economic efficiency and welfare achieved by aligning MTRs more closely with marginal costs
benefits telephony users in general.40
Second, the argument loses much of its force when call externalities, or receiver benefits,
matter. To see this, note that with call externalities the total surplus created on a mobile
network by a fixed-to-mobile call can be written as
sfm = (a− ct)qf + βu (qf ) ,
where a is the fixed-to-mobile termination rate, ct the marginal cost of termination, and qf
the length of the call. An increase in a above marginal cost increases the profits of the mobile
network, some or all of which is passed on to mobile subscribers via the waterbed effect, but
37The corresponding estimates for a mobile demand elasticity of -0.3 are £255 million and £1.4 billion, respec-
tively. By contrast, the EC’s maximum estimate was 1 billion euros for the entire European Union for the period
2007 — 2012, as noted above.
38The waterbed effect refers to the phenomenon whereby a reduction (or increase) in MTRs leads to a corre-
sponding increase (or reduction) in subscription charges to mobile subscribers. See Armstrong and Wright (2009a,
pp. F284-285). Genakos and Valletti (forthcoming) present some empirical evidence on the strength of this effect
in twenty countries.
39This result has led a number of authors to suggest that mobile networks should prefer to agree on below-cost
mobile-to-mobile termination charges, and that such an agreement would harm mobile subscribers who prefer the
more intense competition created by higher MTRs.
40According to data published in Ofcom (2009b, Fig. 4.62, p. 248), 80% of UK households subscribe to both
fixed and mobile services.
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simultaneously reduces the utility received by the mobile network’s subscribers from fixed-to-
mobile calls through reducing qf . With a high ratio of receiver to sender benefits (i.e. the call
externality parameter in our model), the latter effect outweighs the former and hence welfare
on mobile networks becomes a decreasing function of the level of MTRs.41 ,42
The argument that above-cost, mobile-to-mobile termination rates benefit mobile consumers
is also incomplete. As demonstrated by Hoernig (2009b), it is only necessarily true in models
with two mobile networks. With n > 2 firms, although a reduction in the mobile-to-mobile
termination rate still mitigates network effects, and hence relaxes competition between mobile
networks for market share, the reduction in competition may or may not be sufficient to reduce
consumer surplus in equilibrium, and it is less likely to do so the more significant are call
externalities, and the larger the number of competing networks.
The upshot is that it is an empirical question whether a reduction in fixed-to-mobile and
mobile-to-mobile termination charges will result in an increase or a decrease in welfare and
consumer surplus on mobile networks considered in isolation, especially in markets with more
than two firms. In our simulations, when call externalities are significant consumer surplus and
welfare increase in both the mobile and fixed markets. Hence, the trade-off between increasing
welfare and maintaining consumer surplus in the mobile market disappears once call externalities
and a realistic number of networks are taken into account.
Our simulation model thus provides a rigorous and quantifiable approach to assessing the
likely short-run effects of changes in MTRs, taking account of call externalities, calls to and from
the fixed network, and a realistic number of firms. Nevertheless, our model assumes that the
size of the market (i.e. the total number of mobile subscribers), mobile networks’ market shares,
and the structure of retail prices remain constant. We now consider each of these longer-run
issues in turn.43
Market expansion argument: Mobile operators in Europe have long argued that high MTRs
result in mobile firms subsidizing connection and acquisition costs for new subscribers, via
the waterbed effect, and that this leads to market expansion which benefits new and existing
mobile subscribers. In the presence of such network externalities, socially-optimal MTRs should
therefore exceed marginal costs.44
Armstrong and Wright (2009a) have recently provided some theoretical support for this pol-
icy. Noting that mobile subscribers’ utility increases with both the fixed-to-mobile and mobile-
41See Armstrong and Wright (2009b) and Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010, Section 5.1) for further discussion.
42A third caveat is of course that the argument for high fixed-to-mobile termination rates depends upon the
strength of the waterbed effect, about which we can say little in practice. Some preliminary results can be found
in Genakos and Valletti (forthcoming).
43Our simulation model also assumes that the markets for fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile calls are sepa-
rate, while in reality most consumers have access to both types of network and are able to substitute between the
two types of call. Armstrong and Wright (2009a) consider this issue, and conclude that high termination rates for
FTM calls lead consumers to substitute MTM for FTM calls. Thus a reduction in FTM termination rates will
result in a rebalancing of calls originating on fixed and mobile networks, increasing the proportion of the former.
Ofcom (2007, p. 391) assumed that the relevant cross-elasticities of demand were small.
44Since the Competition Commission’s 2003 inquiry, mobile firms in the UK have received a “network externality
surcharge” on top of their regulated MTRs for this purpose. See Competition Commission (2003, pp. 225-252).
In its 2008/09 inquiry, the Competition Commission revisited the issue and decided that a network externality
surcharge was no longer justified (see Competition Commission, 2009, Section 4). Network externality surcharges
have also been applied in Belgium, Greece, Italy and Sweden (Cullen International, 2008), although the European
Commission (in EC, 2009b) now recommends against this policy.
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to-mobile termination charges in their duopoly model, they suggest that ‘this observation implies
that firms and the regulator can use relatively high termination charges as a means to expand
the number of mobile subscribers.’ To demonstrate this formally, they consider a “Hotelling
model with hinterlands” in which the total number of mobile subscribers is increasing in the
utility they derive from joining one or other of the mobile networks. The possibility of market
expansion introduces “market-level” network effects: when a new subscriber joins a network, the
utility of the existing subscribers to any network increases since there are now more subscribers
they can call, either on-net or off-net. Armstrong and Wright (2009a) conclude that the socially
efficient MTRs should exceed the marginal cost of termination, and that the fixed-to-mobile and
mobile-to-mobile rates should be set at different levels, if feasible.45
As discussed immediately above (see also Harbord and Pagnozzi, 2010, Section 5), these
conclusions do not necessarily survive the inclusion of call externalities in the analysis, nor an
increase in the number of competing mobile networks. When call externalities matter, a high
fixed-to-mobile termination rate does not necessarily increase the surplus of mobile subscribers,
since the fixed-to-mobile termination rate which maximizes surplus on mobile networks can be
above or below marginal cost, and even below zero. Whether fixed-to-mobile termination rates
can be used to increase mobile take-up is therefore an empirical question, which depends upon
the strength of call externalities and other market parameters, such as the elasticity of demand
for fixed-to-mobile calls. And in mobile markets with more than two firms, mobile subscribers’
consumer surplus is not necessarily increasing in the mobile-to-mobile termination rate either
(and is less likely to be so when call externalities are significant). It is therefore unclear that
setting either fixed-to-mobile or mobile-to-mobile termination rates above cost will result in an
increase in the number of mobile subscribers overall. In theory at least, it could equally well be
that MTRs below marginal cost are required to induce market expansion.
Further doubt is cast on the market expansion argument by evidence on mobile subscription,
or penetration, rates in bill-and-keep countries versus “calling party network pays” (CPNP)
countries with higher MTRs. Recent studies undertaken for Ofcom (Ofcom 2009a, Annexes 5
and 7) find that once data on mobile take-up rates are corrected for multiple subscriptions,
which are more common in CPNP countries, there is little measurable difference in penetration
rates between bill-and-keep and CPNP countries (see also Analysys Mason, 2008, pp. 7-10).
While mobile usage, or call volumes, tend to be much higher in bill-and-keep countries, mobile
subscription levels do not appear to depend strongly on the level of MTRs.46
Market shares: Our second assumption, that market shares remain constant, can also be
questioned. Although the model of Hoernig (2009b) recomputes equilibrium market shares
following changes in MTRs, building ex ante asymmetry in market shares into the model requires
fixing an “asymmetry parameter”, which should itself be a function of the level of MTRs in the
long run. Hence there is little loss of generality in setting the short-run market shares directly,
and this simplifies the model’s calculations.
In the longer run, however, reducing MTRs should reduce barriers to entry and growth
for smaller networks, and this may result in the equalization of market shares over time. As
45Armstrong (2002), Wright (2002) and Valletti and Houpis (2005) also found that the welfare-maximizing
fixed-to-mobile termination charge is above cost when there is scope for market expansion. These models did not
allow for mobile-to-mobile calls, however.
46See also ERG (2009, pp. 22-26) which concludes that there is no strong correlation between penetration (or
ownership) rates and MTRs.
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numerous authors have observed, above-cost MTRs exacerbate the network effects associated
with “tariff-mediated network externalities”, by increasing mobile networks’ strategic incentives
to set high on-net/off-net price differentials, and this is to the detriment of smaller networks and
new entrants.47 As described by Armstrong and Wright (2009b, p. 95):
“.... High MTM charges may deter entry or induce exit of a smaller mobile rival.
By setting above-cost MTM termination charges, the incumbent networks can induce
network effects which make entry less attractive for the newcomer. With high MTM
charges, off-net calls will be more expensive, which particularly hurts a small network
since the bulk of its subscribers’ calls will be off-net. An additional effect of high off-
net call prices will be to reduce the number of calls received by a small network’s
subscribers, thereby further reducing its ability to compete when call externalities are
important.”
A move to much lower MTRs, or bill-and-keep, should therefore result not only in a more
efficient wholesale and retail price structure in the short run, as represented in our model,
but also eliminate barriers to entry in the mobile market, and result in a medium to long-run
tendency for networks’ market shares to equalize. If this competition-increasing effect were found
to be large, our model may significantly underestimate the longer-run benefits for consumers of
reducing MTRs.
Receiving party pays: Finally, reducing the level of MTRs may affect the types of tariffs
offered by mobile networks. In most “bill-and-keep” (or near bill-and-keep) countries (e.g.
Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong, the United States), mobile firms have adopted receiving party
pays (RPP), and Lopez (2008, p.2) argues that the existing literature pays too little attention to
the fact that networks may charge for receiving calls when MTRs are reduced.48 So would the
reductions in MTRs considered in this paper lead to reception charges for mobile subscribers,
and would this increase or decrease economic efficiency and social welfare?
The literature on this subject is still in its infancy, so no definite answer can be given. Jeon
et al. (2004, pp. 105-107) analyze duopoly competition with network-based price discrimination
and reception charges, and show that for β < 1, in any symmetric equilibrium off-net reception
charges are either infinite or equal to ct − a depending on parameter values. For reasonable
parameter values, bill-and-keep can lead to reception charges so high that no off-net calls are
made. Hermalin and Katz (2009), on the other hand, consider a Cournot model in which the
strategic motive for increasing off-net prices is absent, implying that networks always set off-net
sender and receiver prices equal to “perceived” marginal cost, pij = c0 + a and rji = ct − a,
respectively (where rji is the reception charge on network j for receiving a call from network i).
Thus if bill-and-keep were adopted (a = 0), the total cost of an off-net call would be divided
between the sender and receiver in proportion to the costs incurred on each network. The two
models therefore lead to strikingly different predictions concerning profit-maximizing sender and
receiver charges for given access, or termination, charges, and Hermalin and Katz (2009, p. 30)
47See Armstrong and Wright (2009b); Cabral (2009), Calzada and Valletti (2008); Hoernig (2007) (2009a); and
Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010).
48See EC (2009b, p. 31). In the EC’s view, “RPP may evolve after a reduction of the regulated termination
charge or as a response to a Bill and Keep system”. Ofcom (2009a, p. 38), however, views this as “highly unlikely,
given the likely consumer reaction.”
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remark that, “the importance of such cross-carrier effects is an empirical question that remains
to be answered”.
Whatever the theoretical predictions, as noted by Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010, Section 6),
existing empirical evidence suggests that mobile networks in bill-and-keep countries do not set
very high reception charges. Ofcom (2009, Annex 9) presents evidence on sender versus reception
charges in the United States, and finds that “all operators for all levels of output charge the same
price for both types of calls.” And the recent study by Analysys Mason (2008) found that while
all bill-and-keep countries have RPP retail charging regimes, there exist free incoming call plans
in each of these jurisdictions, and the relative importance of these appears to increase over time
(Analysys Mason, 2008, p. 4). Hence, as an empirical matter, it is unclear that adoption of
bill-and-keep would necessarily lead to the imposition of significant reception charges for mobile
calls.
6 Analysis of the Orange/T-Mobile Merger
Another application of our simulation model is to analyze the recently-approved merger between
Orange and T-Mobile in the UK. The merger will create a firm with at least 37% of all UK mobile
subscribers, and increase the market’s Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) from just over 2083
to just over 2750. Our model allows us to predict the merger’s unilateral effects on economic
efficiency, consumer welfare and mobile firms’ profits.
So as not overestimate any positive or negative effects of the merger, we now assume that
there are six independent mobile competitors in the market, by including Virgin Mobile as an
independent firm, with the pre - and post-merger subscriber numbers and market shares specified
in Table 6.1 below (see Section 3 above for details). This is a conservative assumption, since the
arrangement between T-Mobile and Virgin Mobile probably means that the two firms are not
entirely independent of each other as retail competitors.49
Table 6.1 Subscribers and Market Shares, 2008/09
H3G Vodafone O2 Orange T-Mobile Virgin
Subscribers (m) 4.5 17.7 21.5 16.4 15.7 4.76
Pre-Merger Market Shares (%) 5.9% 23.0% 28.0% 21.3% 15.7% 6.2%
Post-Merger Market Shares (%) 5.9% 23.0% 28.0% 37.0% 6.2%
Given the networks’ market shares, we have calibrated the value for the network differen-
tiation parameter (σ) of the underlying Hotelling model for each value of the call externality
parameter (β). The resulting values are those given in Table 6.2.50 The choice of this parameter
has no influence at all on our pre-merger and post-merger aggregate welfare comparisons, but
does effect the comparison of profits and consumer surplus in our simulations.51
49The companies themselves assume that Virgin Mobile is an independent network when reporting their post-
merger market share.
50We have calibrated the value of σ for each value of β so that our model “predicts” the same level of mobile
call plus subscription revenue in 2008 as reported by Ofcom (2009d, Fig. 4.39), for 2008 MTRs and annual
per-customer fixed costs of £95.38 (as reported by Ofcom, 2007, A19:18).
51All other assumptions in the model are carried over from the welfare analysis, as described in Section 3 above.
Merger simulation results when we assume an elasticity of demand of −0.3 for both mobile-originated calls and
fixed-to-mobile calls are presented in Annex C.
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Table 6.2 Network Differentiation Parameter
β = 0 β = 0.2 β = 0.4 β = 0.6 β = 0.8 β = 1
σ = 0.001063 0.001015 0.000962 0.000901 0.000832 0.000754
We simulate the effects of the merger under two different assumptions concerning the level of
MTRs. In Section 6.1, the mobile networks’ MTRs are set at Ofcom’s estimates of “LRIC+” for
the final year of the current price control 2010/11, adjusted for inflation to 2008/09 prices.52 In
Section 6.2 the mobile networks’ MTRs are set at zero (i.e. bill-and-keep) prior to the merger.
All reported results are stated in £ million per calendar year in 2008/09 prices. Increases of the
variables under consideration are given by positive values and decreases by negative values.
6.1 Effects of the Merger under 2010/11 MTRs
With MTRs set at their regulated levels for 2010/11, the overall effects of the merger depend on
the strength of call externalities, or receiver benefits. In the absence of call externalities (β = 0),
the merger improves allocative efficiency and welfare by moving more subscribers on to a single
large network, thus avoiding the inefficiencies associated with high off-net call prices. As call
externalities become significant, however, this result is reversed by the strategic incentive of the
newly merged firm to increase its off-net call prices. Hence there is a critical level of β for which
the merger becomes harmful to allocative efficiency and welfare. In our simulations, this always
occurs when β is between one fifth and two fifths. For β = 1, our model predicts overall welfare
losses from the merger exceeding £1.4 billion per year, dwarfing the cost savings of £390 - £420
million per year predicted by the companies themselves.53
Table 6.3 Merger with 2010/11 MTRs
β = 0 β = 0.2 β = 0.4 β = 0.6 β = 0.8 β = 1
Change in Welfare 24 6 -56 -210 -573 -1,465
Change in Consumer Surplus -1,821 -1,883 -1,982 -2,142 -2,418 -2,932
Change in Profits 1,845 1,889 1,926 1,932 1,844 1,467
Even for moderate values of β, such as three fifths, the model predicts a welfare loss of
approximately £210 million per year, and this increases rapidly to £573 million per year when
β reaches four fifths. Hence for moderate to high call externalities the merger would appear to
be detrimental to economic efficiency, even if we allow for all of the cost savings posited by the
companies.
In addition, the merger reduces the intensity of competition between the mobile networks,
which induces them to raise the level of their fixed charges, increasing profits at the expense of
consumer surplus. This results in losses in consumer surplus exceeding £1.8 billion per annum
when β is equal to zero, increasing to more than £2.9 billion per year when β equals one.
52As in Section 4 above, these are the final 2010/11 values as determined by the Competition Commission
(2009) of 4.3 ppm and 4.0 ppm respectively, indexed by inflation to increase from 2006/07 prices to 2008/09
prices. This results in MTRs of 4.3 ppm for Vodafone, O2, T-Mobile and Orange, and 4.6 ppm for H3G.
53Our estimate of the merger’s expected annual cost savings is based on information provided in Orange and T-
Mobile (2009). The calculations are detailed in Annex B. It is not clear that any of the cost savings claimed by the
companies are of a type that would lead to reductions in prices for consumers, since they neither effect marginal
costs nor avoidable per subscriber costs. Hence they may not be taken into account by European competition
authorities. See, for example, EC (2004, Section VII).
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6.2 Effects of the Merger under Bill-and-Keep
If we perform our simulations with much lower MTRs, such as those proposed in the recent Euro-
pean Commission Recommendation, the (negative or positive) effects of the merger on aggregate
welfare are much reduced. The merger’s effects on consumer surplus, however, vary depend-
ing on the effects of the reduction in MTRs on market shares. We consider two possibilities.
First, we assume that bill-and-keep is adopted prior to the merger, with no (short-run) effect
on network market shares. In this case, with very low receiver/sender benefit ratios (β < 0.4)
the merger improves allocative efficiency by just over £2 million per year, but this welfare gain
falls to zero when β reaches one half (see Table 6.4a). The maximum welfare loss of just over
£29 million per year occurs when β is equal to one. If we allow for the companies’ claimed cost
savings of £390 - £420 million per year, this means that the merger will be welfare improving
for all reasonable values of the call externality parameter.
But the merger still results in large decreases in consumer surplus for all values of β, from
£1.98 billion per annum when β = 0 to £2.74 billion per year when β = 1. Hence even if a
regime of very low MTRs were adopted, such as bill-and-keep, the merger creates significant
welfare losses for consumers.
.
Table 6.4a Short-run Effects of Merger under Bill-and-Keep
β = 0 β = 0.2 β = 0.4 β = 0.6 β = 0.8 β = 1
Change in Welfare 2 2 1 -1 -8 -29
Change in Consumer Surplus -1,983 -2,065 -2,171 -2,309 -2,491 -2,743
Change in Profits 1,985 2,067 2,172 2,308 2,483 2,715
The adoption of bill-and-keep should result in a medium to long-run tendency for networks’
market shares to equalize, however, due to the relationship between MTRs, ‘tariff-mediated
network externalities’ and positive or negative network effects. A reduction of MTRs to zero
effectively eliminates the competitive advantage of larger networks, and this should promote
growth by smaller networks.54 To capture this, we assume that network’s market shares are
equalized both before and after the merger (see Table 6.4b). In this case, the merger’s effect on
aggregate welfare ranges from just over £1 million per year (when β = 0), to minus £2 million
per year (when β = 1). The effect on consumer surplus is also somewhat ameliorated, and varies
between minus £1.2 billion per year (when β = 0), to minus £ 1.7 million per year (when β = 1).
Table 6.4b Merger under Bill-and-Keep with Market Share Symmetry
β = 0 β = 0.2 β = 0.4 β = 0.6 β = 0.8 β = 1
Change in Welfare 1 1 1 0 -1 -2
Change in Consumer Surplus -1,220 -1,270 -1,335 -1,420 -1,533 -1,689
Change in Profits 1,221 1,271 1,336 1,421 1,533 1,686
6.3 Discussion
Our analysis shows that with MTRs set at their regulated levels for 2010/11, the aggregate
effects of the Orange/T-Mobile merger depend on the strength of call externalities. The merger
54 Indeed, when call externalities are absent or small, adopting bill-and-keep can result in “negative network
effects”, and subscribers will, all else equal, prefer to join a smaller network (see Armstrong Wright, 2009, p.
F286).
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improves allocative efficiency and welfare in the absence of receiver benefits by moving more
subscribers on to a single large network. This observation provides a stark illustration of the
inefficiencies created by the current approach to regulating MTRs. In the absence of call exter-
nalities, efficiency and welfare (although not consumer surplus) would be increased even further
by a merger of all five of the mobile network operators in the UK market into a single monopoly
network, so that all mobile-to-mobile calls became more efficiently-priced on-net calls. When
receiver benefits matter, this is result is reversed, so there is a critical level of the call externality
parameter for which the merger becomes harmful to allocative efficiency.
Under bill-and-keep, these aggregate effects on welfare and efficiency are much reduced, since
off-net call prices are much closer to their efficient level once MTRs are set at zero. Nevertheless,
the merger significantly reduces competition and consumer surplus in each of the scenarios we
have considered. With the 2010/11 levels of regulated MTRs, these losses exceed £1.8 billion per
annum in the absence of call externalities, and £2.9 billion per year when β equals one. Under
bill-and-keep, the consumer surplus losses still exceed £1.2 billion per annum for any level of
MTRs, even once we allow for a longer-run tendency for networks’ market shares to equalize.
The European Commission has recently approved the merger, subject to certain undertakings
agreed by the companies relating to network-sharing arrangements and divestiture of spectrum
(see EC, 2010). It is not obvious how these undertakings address the competition and welfare-
related concerns illustrated by our simulation model, however.
7 Conclusion
The regulation of mobile termination rates based on fully-allocated costs (or “long-run incre-
mental cost plus”), results in regulated MTRs an order of magnitude above reasonable estimates
of long-run incremental, or marginal, costs on mobile networks. In the presence of call exter-
nalities, efficient pricing on mobile networks requires MTRs below marginal cost, and this has
led to increasing calls for reform (for example, Harbord and Pagnozzi, 2010). The European
Commission’s 2009 Recommendation represents a radical shift in regulatory policy, which may
ultimately lead to the abolition of MTRs altogether. While the recent theoretical literature
provides some qualitative support for this change in policy, in this paper we have provided a
rigorous and quantifiable approach to assessing the effects of significant reductions in MTRs in
the UK mobile market, and elsewhere.
Our simulations show that reducing MTRs broadly in line with the European Commission’s
recommendation increases social welfare, consumer surplus and networks’ profits in the UK
mobile market. Depending on the strength of call externalities, social welfare may increase by
as much as £360 million to £2.5 billion per year. In addition, contrary to claims made in the
recent literature, our simulations confirm that reducing MTRs can also benefit mobile subscribers
considered in isolation in oligopoly markets, especially when call externalities are significant. Our
short-run welfare analysis thus lends support to a move away from fully-allocated cost pricing
and towards much lower MTRs, with bill-and-keep often resulting in the largest increase in
overall welfare. Reducing mobile termination rates should not only result in a more efficient
wholesale and retail price structure in the short run but, by eliminating barriers to entry caused
by “tariff-mediated network effects”, increase competition and welfare in mobile markets in the
longer run.
We have also analyzed the likely effects of the merger between Orange and T-Mobile, and
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shown that its overall effect on efficiency depends on the strength of call externalities, when
MTRs are set at the their current, regulated levels. The adoption of bill-and-keep should ame-
liorate these aggregate welfare effects, although serious concerns about the merger’s negative
impact on consumers remain. The undertakings agreed between the companies and the Euro-
pean Commission do not appear to address these concerns.
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Annex A Welfare Simulations with a Mobile Demand Elasticity of -0.3
This annex reports aggregate simulation results for call externality parameters (β) of 0,
0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1, respectively, and for a LRMC value of 1.0 ppm when we assume a demand
elasticity of -0.3 for both FTM and MTM calls. All reported results are stated in £m per
calendar year in 2008/09 prices. Increases of the variables under consideration, as compared to
the base scenario, (LRIC+) are given by positive values and decreases by negative values.
Aggregate effects
Table A.1 Change in Welfare Over “LRIC+” Pricing
β = 0 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 1
LRMC Pricing 255 434 668 987 1438
Reciprocal with Fixed 260 458 716 1067 1563
Bill-and-Keep 258 459 722 1078 1582
Table A.2 Change in Consumer Surplus Over “LRIC+” Pricing
β = 0 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 1
LRMC Pricing -38 81 234 440 729
Reciprocal with Fixed -89 41 209 434 748
Bill-and-Keep -105 27 197 425 743
Table A.3 Change in Profits Over “LRIC+” Pricing
β = 0 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 1
LRMC Pricing 293 353 434 546 709
Reciprocal with Fixed 349 417 507 633 815
Bill-and-Keep 363 432 524 653 839
Mobile telephony
Table A.4 Change in Mobile Welfare Over “LRIC+” Pricing
β = 0 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 1
LRMC Pricing -287 -108 127 446 897
Reciprocal with Fixed -416 -218 40 391 887
Bill-and-Keep -454 -253 10 366 871
Table A.5 Change in Mobile Consumer Surplus Over “LRIC+” Pricing
β = 0 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 1
LRMC Pricing -512 -393 -239 -33 255
Reciprocal with Fixed -681 -551 -383 -159 156
Bill-and-Keep -728 -597 -427 -199 120
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Table A.6 Change in Mobile Profits Over “LRIC+” Pricing
β = 0 β = 0.25 β = 0.5 β = 0.75 β = 1
LRMC Pricing 225 285 366 479 642
Reciprocal with Fixed 265 333 423 549 731
Bill-and-Keep 275 344 437 565 751
Fixed telephony
Table A.7 Change Over "LRIC+" Pricing
Welfare Consumer Surplus Profits
LRMC Pricing 541 473 68
Reciprocal with Fixed 676 592 84
Bill-and-Keep 712 623 88
Annex B Efficiency Gains from the Orange/T-Mobile Merger55
Orange and T-Mobile forecast efficiency gains totalling £545m a year from 2015 onwards.56
However in the preceding years 2010 to 2014, forecast annual gains are generally lower than this
due to implementation costs and the phasing in of savings. Orange and T-Mobile forecast:
• annual operating expenditure (opex) savings of £445m from 2014 onwards;
• the phasing in of opex savings at 15% of £445m in 2010, 75% of £445m in 2012, and 100%
of £445m in 2014;
• opex integration costs to net off these savings totalling between £600m and £800m between
2010 and 2014;
• annual net capital expenditure (capex) savings of £100m from 2015 onwards;
• total net capex savings of £620m between 2010 and 2014; and
• a Net Present Value (NPV) of over £3.5bn in net savings.
We have used this information to estimate the equivalent level annuity which would match
these efficiency gains, i.e. a constant per annum net saving which delivers the same NPV as the
variable profile of savings described above.
We do not know the forecasting horizon over which the NPV of £3.5bn has been calculated,
nor do we know some of the detailed cashflow assumptions used to calculate that NPV (e.g.
phasing of opex savings in 2011, precise level of integration costs). We have therefore developed
a range of annuity estimates for each of two assumed forecasting horizons: 25 years and 100
years. In each case, we have calculated the level annuity equivalent to a high gain scenario,
55We are grateful to Adam Mantzos for preparing this annex.
56All figures sourced from the presentation, Combination of Orange UK & T-Mobile UK: Creating a new mobile
champion, Orange and T-Mobile, 8 September 2009.
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where the detailed assumptions are assumed to deliver relatively high gains within the envelope
provided by the available information (e.g. opex savings in 2011 assumed at 50% of £ 445m,
integration costs assumed at £600m); and a low gain scenario at the other extreme (e.g. opex
savings in 2011 assumed at 30% of £ 445m, integration costs assumed at £800m).
For each scenario, we have calculated the discount rate that would generate an NPV of
£3.5bn for the given forecasting horizon and set of detailed assumptions, and then calculated
the level annuity which, over that same forecasting horizon, would also generate an NPV of
£3.5bn.
Our results are shown below:
Equivalent level annuity (£m) High gain Low gain
25 year horizon 410 388
100 year horizon 419 399
Annex C Merger Simulations with a Mobile Demand Elasticity of -0.3
We have re-calibrated the value for the network differentiation parameter (σ) for each value
of the call externality parameter (β) for a demand elasticity of -0.3. The resulting values are
those given in Table C.057
Table C.0 Network Differentiation Parameter
β = 0 β = 0.2 β = 0.4 β = 0.6 β = 0.8 β = 1
σ = 0.001057 0.001026 0.000990 0.000949 0.000901 0.000843
All reported results are stated in £m per calendar year in 2008/09 prices. Increases of the
variables under consideration are given by positive values and decreases by negative values.
Effects of the Merger under 2010/11 MTRs
Table C.1 Merger with 2010/11 MTRs
β = 0 β = 0.2 β = 0.4 β = 0.6 β = 0.8 β = 1
Change in Welfare 14 4 -34 -126 -344 -879
Change in Consumer Surplus -1,857 -1,893 -1,950 -2,043 -2,203 -2,500
Change in Profits 1,871 1,896 1,917 1,917 1,859 1,621
57Calibrated for each value of β so that the model “predicts” the same level of mobile call plus subscription
revenue in 2008 as that reported by Ofcom (2009d, Fig. 4.39), in the presence of 2008 MTRs and an annual
per-customer fixed cost of £95.38 as reported by Ofcom (2007, A19:18).
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Effects of the Merger under Bill-and-Keep
Table C.2a Merger under Bill-and-Keep
β = 0 β = 0.2 β = 0.4 β = 0.6 β = 0.8 β = 1
Change in Welfare 1 1 1 -1 -5 -17
Change in Consumer Surplus -1,993 -2,043 -2,108 -2,192 -2,303 -2,456
Change in Profits 1,994 2,045 2,109 2,192 2,298 2,438
Table C.2b Merger under Bill-and-Keep with Market Share Symmetry
β = 0 β = 0.2 β = 0.4 β = 0.6 β = 0.8 β = 1
Change in Welfare 1 1 0 0 0 -1
Change in Consumer Surplus -1,225 -1,256 -1,296 -1,348 -1,417 -1,512
Change in Profits 1,226 1,257 1,297 1,348 1,417 1,510
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